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ADDRESSING FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
SOCIAL VIOLENCE: THE ORDINARY CITIZEN'S
VOTING RIGHTS BEYOND SHELBY COUNTY,
NORTH CAROLINA AND OHIO
Benjamin G. Davis*
ABSTRACT
This essay builds on my experience with a voter integrity group, True
the Vote, at its Ohio Summit meeting on August 25, 2012, and subsequent
developments in the United States Supreme Court and states. I examine
this topic experience through four lenses: (1) private and public forms of
what I term social violence; negotiation theory; (2) recent work on explicit
bias, implicit bias, and stereotype threat; (3) Derrick Bell's work on interest
convergence theory and the personal limits of that approach when one op-
erates in both the domestic and international law spheres; (4) Francesco
Alberoni's work on how movements get started and, in particular, how a
person reaches "depressive overload" and what he terms the "nascent
state," seeking affinity with others to create a movement that confronts
institutions. Through these four lenses, I hope to assist reflection on a
manner of thinking about voting rights beyond Shelby County, North Car-
olina, and Ohio.
I. INTRODUCTION
As Max Weber noted in his lecture on politics as a vocation, it has
become axiomatic that "the modern state is a compulsory association which
organizes domination. It has been successful in seeking to monopolize the
legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a terri-
tory."' This monopoly on violence operates to both set the structure in
which the state makes legitimate exercise of its monopoly on violence
(public social violence) and the space for legitimate private violence in that
state (private social violence). The types of private violence described in
the next section are lawful, in the sense of being permitted under concepts
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law, Visiting Professor Spring
2014, Albany Law School. The author expresses appreciation for all the courtesies extended to him by
the Mississippi College Law Review through La'Toyia Slay (Editor in Chief), Brittany Brooks (Editor
in Chief), Dustin Carter (Chief Executive Editor), and others, Professor Angela Mae Kupenda, and
Dean Jim Rosenblatt. This essay draws on a presentation made on November 5, 2012 at the Cardozo
Journal of Conflict Resolution Symposium entitled "Negotiating the Extremes: Impossible Political
Dialogues in the 21st Century" and, in particular, Benjamin G. Davis, On an Ordinary African-
American Citizen Negotiating Voting Rights and Voter Intimidation in Ohio 2012, CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. BLOG (Apr. 29, 2014), available at http://cardozojcr.comfblog/2014/04/benjamin
davis (last visited June 25, 2014). All errors and omissions are the responsibility of the author.
1. MAX WEBER, LECTURE ON POLITICS AS A VOCATION 4-5, available at http://www.sscnet.ucla
.edu/ polisci/ethos/Weber-vocation.pdf (last visited June 25, 2014).
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of freedom of speech and freedom of association in our polity permitted in
the structure of the state (public social violence). The interplay between
the articulation of the structure by the organs of the state and the private
acts gives one the sum of the kinds of (although legitimate in the sense of
lawful, nevertheless) social violence inflicted upon the ordinary citizen as
part of the American polity. Part II, in the setting of voting rights, provides
some illustrations of different types of private and public social violence
that confront the ordinary citizen. Part III will then explore different ap-
proaches to addressing these types of social violence, and the opportunity
an international dimension might play in sharpening the ordinary citizen's
ability to confront voting and racial discrimination. Part IV builds on this
expanded view, the experience of what I term a dissociative moment when
the ordinary citizen experiences the full contradiction of voting and racial
discrimination within the domestic polity, and suggests a path from this
state of dissonance to coherence in the manner of confronting these twin
evils of voting and racial discrimination. Part V serves as a conclusion.
II. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SOCIAL VIOLENCE
This Part is divided into a presentation of (A) private social violence,
(B) public social violence, and (C) the combined effect of those sources of
social violence on the ordinary citizen in the American polity.
A. Private Social Violence on Voting Rights-an Ohio Example
At the height of the lead up to the 2012 Presidential election, I was
subjected to a type of non-physical violence-private social violence for
want of a better term. It started at an August 25, 2012 True the Vote
"Voter Integrity" Meeting at a Holiday Inn in Worthington, Ohio, at which
I was essentially the only person of color in the audience, and subsequently
continued over a few days. At the event, the sheer quantity of criticism of
black leaders under the "race hustlers" meme by an African-American wo-
man speaker was oppressive. Being threatened with removal and having
security called on me after asking questions at the Question and Answer
part of the event was intimidating. Finding out later that, due to the threat
of hostile private individuals with guns in the room, some persons of good
will in the audience felt impelled to call the police out of fear for my safety
was disturbing. Organizers called the police because I asked questions.
People of goodwill called the police fearing I might be shot. End result:
having the police called on me while exercising democratic rights. Being
called a "coon" and "faggot" in front of my son was shocking. All was not
bad, and in fact several persons were genuinely welcoming. I learned at the
True the Vote meeting of the "voter integrity" methods being used by the
group through statistical voter roll purging, private poll observers challeng-
ing voters at the polls, the bringing of lawsuits to purge rolls, and the en-
couragement of law changes such as voter identification that increases the
burdens on ordinary citizens seeking to vote. All of these actions appeared
to be perfectly permissible by private citizens. But, overall, various
[VOL. 33:181
SEPARATION OF POWERS SOCIAL VIOLENCE
messages of unwelcome were directed at me over the day, leaving my son
and I exhausted by the end. The harassment continued over the next days
as a blog-post excoriated me and private citizens took it upon themselves to
communicate to the Dean of my Law School their displeasure with me,
notwithstanding that I had been at the True the Vote meeting in my private
capacity. Discussion of me even rose to the level of the margins of the
Board of Directors meeting at the state university where I am employed,
demonstrating, at least to me, the virulence of the animosity toward me of
some in that True the Vote meeting room.' All of these persons were of
course ordinary citizens and none of them actually inflicted any physical
violence on me. However, the experience of spiritual violence was persis-
tent, aggressive, debilitating, and, as a result, deeply troubling.
B. Public Social Violence on Voting Rights-Across the Nation
In our compound republic, public social violence is made up of actions
by those at the levers of power in the 50 states in our federalism (discussed
in 1 below) and actions by those at the levers of power at the federal level
in the separation of powers (discussed in 2 below).
1. Federalism Social Violence-Voter Suppression
In contrast to the private social violence described in the previous sec-
tion, public social violence on voting rights is reflected through the use of
the public process (such as in North Carolina, but well beyond that state) in
order to put in place restrictive laws that increase the burdens on those
seeking to exercise the franchise. This type of experimentation includes:
[1] identification laws including photo identification laws (2013 - 25 states;
2014 - 11 states) and proof of citizenship laws (2013 - 8 states; 2014 - 2
states), [2] making voter registration harder (2013 - 8 states; 2014 - 8 states),
[3] reducing early voting opportunities (2013 - 8 states; 2014 - 2 states), [4]
making it harder for students to vote (2013 - 2 states, 2014 - 1 state), [5]
making it harder to restore voting rights (2013 - 2 states), [6] reducing op-
portunities to vote by mail (2014 - 5 states), and [7] making voter purges
worse (2014 - 1 state).
A graphic presentation of these activities by state across our federal-
ism is presented in Illustration 1 below.4
2. A more detailed version of this experience is discussed in Benjamin G. Davis, On an Ordi-
nary African-American Citizen Negotiating Voting Rights and Voter Intimidation in Ohio 2012, CAR-
DOZO J. CONFLICr RESOL. BLOG (Apr. 29, 2014), available at http://cardozojcr.com/blog/2014/04/
benjamindavis (last visited June 25, 2014).
3. Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law, Voting Laws Roundup 2013
(Dec. 19, 2013), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/election-2013-voting-laws-roundup
(last visited June 25, 2014); Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law, Voting
Laws Roundup 2014 (Feb. 6, 2014), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-laws-
roundup-2014 (last visited June 25, 2014).
4. Wendy R. Weiser & Erik Opsal, The State of Voting in 2014, Brennan Center for Justice, 2
(June 17, 2014), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/State-of-Voting_
2014.pdf (last visited June 25, 2014).
2014]





As shown above, voting restrictions have been implemented in a wide
number of states since 2010. To be specific,
new laws range from photo ID requirements to early voting
cutbacks to voter registration restrictions. Partisanship and
race were key factors in this movement. Most restrictions
passed through GOP-controlled legislatures and in states
with increases in minority turnout. In 15 states, 2014 will be
the first major federal election with these new restrictions in
place. Ongoing court cases could affect laws in six of these
states. The courts will play a crucial role in 2014, with ongo-
ing suits challenging laws in seven states. Voting advocates
have filed suits in both federal and state courts challenging
new restrictions, and those suits are ongoing in seven states
- Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas,
and Wisconsin. There is also an ongoing case in Iowa over
administrative action that could restrict voting. More cases
are possible as we get closer to the election.5
The racial component of these voting restrictions is born out in the
analysis of the patterns of where these restrictions have been put in place.6
As a recent study has found,
5. Id. at 1.
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[r]ace was also a significant factor. Of the 11 states with the
highest African-American turnout in 2008, 7 have new re-
strictions in place. Of the 12 states with the largest Hispanic
population growth between 2000 and 2010, 9 passed laws
making it harder to vote. And nearly two-thirds of states -
or 9 out of 15 - previously covered in whole or in part by
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act because of a history of
race discrimination in voting have new restrictions since the
2010 election. Social science studies bear this out. According
to the University of Massachusetts Boston study, states with
higher minority turnout were more likely to pass restrictive
voting laws. A University of California study suggests that
legislative support for voter ID laws was motivated by racial
bias.7
2. Public Social Violence on Voting Rights-Separation of Powers
Voter Suppression
At the same time, voting discrimination still exists; no one
doubts that. The question is whether the [Voting Rights] Act's
extraordinary measures, including its disparate treatment of
the States, continue to satisfy constitutional requirements. As
we put it a short time ago, "the Act imposes current burdens
and must be justified by current needs. "'
This quote from the majority opinion in the Shelby County case re-
flects a balancing of the recognition that voting discrimination still exists
with the concerns of disparate treatment of the States.9 Viewed by an ordi-
nary citizen in the context of a key framer's vision of both separation of
powers and federalism, it is both an ironic and troubling phrase for the
following reasons.
Our Constitution creates this compound republic as a means to pro-
vide a double security to the rights of the people, a source of state sover-
eignty in our system. As was described by one of our key Framers of the
Constitution:
In the compound republic of America, the power surren-
dered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdi-
vided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a
7. Id. (citations omitted).
8. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013) (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util.
Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)).
9. This concern for a "tradition" of "equal sovereignty" has its origins in the ante-bellum and
infamous Dred Scott decision. See James Blacksher & Lani Guinier, Free at Last: Rejecting Equal
Sovereignty and Restoring the Constitutional Right to Vote Shelby County v. Holder, 8 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 39, 40 (2014).
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double security arises to the rights of the people. The differ-
ent governments will control each other, at the same time
that each will be controlled by itself.10
The relative solicitude of the Supreme Court for the burdens on the states
subject to the Voting Rights Act while recognizing the existence of voting
discrimination turns on its head for the ordinary citizen the apparent goal
of the double security structure of the Constitution. Here, the federal and
state structure operate together to narrow the public protections of voting
rights of those subject to voting discrimination. The public social struc-
ture's preference for state equality and relative indifference to the impact
of this preference on those experiencing voting discrimination leaves the
ordinary citizen to his own devices. The ordinary citizen is left to find other
means to protect himself against experienced or potential voting discrimi-
nation in an effort to vindicate the exercise of the franchise (whether the
franchise is viewed as a privilege or right of citizenry).11 By awarding rela-
tive primacy to the state's concerns of sovereignty over the ordinary citizen
concerns with voter discrimination, the significance of the ordinary citizen's
experience of voter discrimination is diminished. At the same time, and
this aspect is also troubling, state-based restrictive measures are given a
new lease on life. Because these enactments are lawful (i.e. developed
within the social structure of the Constitution), and the citizen has a duty to
abide by the laws, the reasoning calls on the citizen to acquiesce in his or
her subordination in front of the power of the 50 states (undergirded with
this federal support) in our federalism. Put another way, the citizen's expe-
rience of voter discrimination matters, but the Shelby County decision
makes it matter a little less.
This decision can be coupled with the recent Schuette decision with
regard to the Michigan state ban of affirmative action by majority vote
through referendum in a polarized vote in which 90 percent of the black
Michigander voters who exercised the franchise opposed the proposition.12
Justice Kennedy, speaking for the majority, wrote that:
There is no authority in the Constitution of the United
States or in this Court's precedents for the Judiciary to set
aside Michigan laws that commit this policy determination
to the voters. See Sailors v. Board of Ed. of County of Kent,
387 U. S. 105, 109 (1967) ("Save and unless the state,
county, or municipal government runs afoul of a federally
protected right, it has vast leeway in the management of its
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), available at http://www.constitution.org/fed/
federa5l.htm (last visited June 10, 2014).
11. See Michelle D. Deardorff, Constructing the Franchise: Citizenship Rights Versus Privileges
and Their Concomitant Policies, 33 Miss. C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
12. See Transcript of Oral Argument of Shanta Driver on behalf of Respondent, Schuette v.
Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. By Any Means
Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (No. 12-682), full transcript available at http://www.oyez.org/
cases/2010-2019/2013/201 3 _12_ 6 82 (last visited June 10, 2014).
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internal affairs"). Deliberative debate on sensitive issues
such as racial preferences all too often may shade into ran-
cor. But that does not justify removing certain court-deter-
mined issues from the voters' reach. Democracy does not
presume that some subjects are either too divisive or too
profound for public debate.' 3
In a setting of state (or local) majority vote determinations where no
individual federally-protected right is viewed by the majority as in-play, the
ordinary citizen is again left to a political process of deliberative debate on
sensitive issues at the state level. This reinforcing of the state and lack of
interest in the polarized voting suggests that a deliberative process with a
polarized electorate on a highly divisive issue of race at the state level is
perfectly permissible and of no concern to the Supreme Court. The ordi-
nary citizen impacted by racial discrimination finds the Constitutional
structure's objective of a double security for the rights of the people, at
least for him, once again turned on its head by leaving him at the mercy of
polarized majorities. Again, this decision is lawful (done within the con-
fines of the Constitutional structure) and the citizen is called to acquiesce
consistent with the civic duty to abide by the laws as interpreted by the
Courts.
C. Combining Private and Public Social Violence
Yet, taken together, these public acts along with the private acts de-
scribed in the previous section can be perceived as forming a whole that the
ordinary citizen finds difficult to abide. The Court decisions are calling for
dialogue within the state structure. Yet, to the extent dialogue seeking in-
terest convergence is met, as occurred in the private setting above, by a
request to leave or a threat of the police being called on the ordinary citi-
zen (or similar private social violence), one senses that one's presence and
assertion of one's agency as an ordinary citizen are seen as an existential
challenge for the others in this dialogue space. One realizes rapidly that
dialogue is not being sought from the ordinary citizen concerned about vot-
ing discrimination or racial discrimination. Rather, what is being sought is
acquiescence to the subordination of one's concerns to a Constitutional
structure of federalism and majoritarian decision-making that was sup-
posed to provide a double security but is turned on its head for this ordi-
nary citizen. The ordinary citizen, by obeying the law, is asked to accept his
own subordination both to other citizens not at risk of such discrimination
and the Constitutional structure. To the extent said ordinary citizen is not
reassured by those who see no invidious purpose in those majoritarian acts
at the state level whatever the effect, a form of anomie is reignited in him.
The ordinary citizen experiences a dissociative moment feeling abandoned
13. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for
Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014).
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rather than protected by the aforesaid double security. In sum, the ordi-
nary citizen is confronted with lawful private and public social violence that
is countenanced in the structure of separation of powers and federalism in
which he exercises his citizenship.
III. APPROACHES TO PROTECTING VOTING RIGHTS
In this section, a series of approaches and their limits to protecting
voting rights are discussed as methods for the ordinary citizen to navigate
the public and private social violence. Negotiation theory, implicit social
cognition theory, and interest convergence theory are first described, as are
their limits. Next, alternate social constructs of freedom and limitations,
drawn from international experience and United States foreign relations
versus international law understanding are introduced as a means of re-
framing the limits of the earlier theories to provide a sharpening of the
analysis of a dissociative moment caused by the heightened contradictions
experienced, and the experience of a profound dissonance.
For negotiation theory, confronted with the kind of private social vio-
lence that is accepted under the public structure, the ordinary citizen might
seek to express his agency through the use of negotiation theory. Princi-
pled negotiation might be seen as more effective than positional bargaining
in this setting due to its appeal to common principles. Taking advantage of
the concepts of principled negotiation, the ordinary citizen can enter the
private space and (1) focus on interests over positions, (2) separate the
people he or she confronts from the problem of protecting voting rights, (3)
try to find objective criteria that might be applied, (4) go to the balcony
with some and look at the problem afresh, and (5) attempt to generate
positive sum solutions out of a zero-sum environment that move all to a
more voting protective consensus. 14 Thus, complying with formal require-
ments for admission to ensure one is entitled to speak in the space is a first
step. Going further and assuring all of a shared belief in the importance of
voter integrity is a way to move from a more confrontational to a more
cooperative form of dialogue. Doing a searching examination under objec-
tive criteria as to whether the means suggested amount to methods of pro-
tecting voting rights or suppressing those rights is a way to highlight the
perceived incoherence between the stated objective and the means of at-
taining that objective. Trying to have a dialogue about these incoherencies
so as to shape alternative solutions (the classic orange peel, orange pulp
splitting of the orange to create a positive sum result) might build consen-
sus. These efforts might encourage the shaping of approaches and means
that assure voter integrity while protecting against voter suppression.
14. For a classic presentation of these concepts, see ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY. & BRUCE
PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed., Penguin
Books 1991).
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On the other hand, the above negotiation tactics depend to a certain
extent on the willingness of the interlocutors to actually "hear" the ordi-
nary citizen. Here, the insights from neuroscience and implicit social cogni-
tion theory on explicit bias, implicit bias, and stereotype threat15 might
inform the context for the above negotiation. Explicit bias16 would imply
directly being confronted by others with their inability to even "hear" the
ordinary citizen because of some characteristic such as race. The "coon"
and "faggot" comments mentioned earlier suggest that where the dominant
experience is in a situation of explicit bias, it may be nearly impossible to
establish a dialogue, as the ordinary citizen is not perceived as worthy of
dialogue. Contrast that with the situation of implicit bias made up of ste-
reotypes (or short-cuts of thinking) together with positive or negative atti-
tudes about those stereotypes that result in implicit social cognitions.t7 In
such a context, depending on the implicit social cognitions at play, the ordi-
nary citizen would or would not be given sufficient credibility to deploy his
art of negotiation. At the same time, the kind of self-inhibiting or self-
defeating approaches that are the result of the fear of reinforcing a nega-
tive stereotype about one's group might add additional complexity as an
internal challenge to communication. The self-policing due to stereotype
threat is exhausting and makes dialogue more difficult and confusing.
Countermeasures can, of course, be deployed to defuse these implicit bi-
ases and stereotype threat risks. The point here is only that explicit biases,
15. This description of explicit bias, implicit bias and stereotype threat borrows substantially
from these excellent sources: Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Implicit Bias, Election '08, and
the Myth of a Post-Racial America, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 659-715 (2010); Samuel R. Bagenstos,
Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 477, 477-93 (2007);
Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias: A Primer for Courts, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS (Aug. 2009), available
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/sections/criminaljustice/PublicDocuments/
unit 3_kang.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited June 25, 2014); Project Implicit, https:/limplicit.harvard.edu/
implicit/ (last visited June 25, 2014); Reducing Stereotype Threat, http://www.reducingstereotypethreat
.org/ (last visited June 25, 2014) (as presented in Benjamin G. Davis, Implicit Bias and Stereotype
Threat CLE, Toledo Bar Association (Apr. 12, 2013) (powerpoint available with the author)).
16. Recent clear examples are described in Cliven Bundy: Are Black People 'Better Off As
Slaves' Than 'Under Government Subsidy?', HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 24, 2014, http://www.huffington
post.com/2014/04/24/ cliven-bundy-racist_ n_5204821.html (last visited June 25, 2014); TMZ, Clippers
Owner Donald Sterling to Girlfriend: Don't Bring Black People to My Games (Audio), YouTunE (Apr.
25, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YhT6d5fMhzI&feature=youtu.be (last visited June 25,
2014).
17. I used the example of my name being similar to that of the late General Benjamin 0. Davis,
Jr. as an example of an implicit bias working in one's favor. Thus, on many occasions I have been
mistaken for the General's grandson based on the implicit bias of the person with whom I am. I am no
relation and have no reason to speak of a relationship with this distinguished person, yet this implicit
social cognition operates to some extent in my life and completely independent of my will. Thus, the
implicit social cognition becomes a lens through which my every act is viewed. Another more negative
example is demonstrated in one study that brought out negative stereotypes and confirmation bias
among law partners. Each partner was provided an identical memo for review with the only difference
in the identification of the author as being African-American or White. The exact same memo aver-
aged a 3.2/5.0 rating under the hypothetical "African American" and a 4.1/5.0 rating under the hypo-
thetical "Caucasian." Yellow Paper Series, Written in Black & White: Exploring Confirmation Bias in
Racialized Perceptions of Writing Skills, NEXTIONS, No. 2014-0404, http://www.nextions.comlwp-con-
tent/files_mf/ 13972237592014040114WritteninBlackandWhiteYPS.pdf (last accessed June 25, 2014).
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implicit bias, and stereotype threat form a context ever present around the
negotiation that impacts the ability for all truly to "hear" each other.
For such a negotiation in the context of explicit bias, implicit bias, and
stereotype threat, one would generally expect positive outcomes primarily
in situations where the interests of a sufficient number of majority (or
white voters or white persons in the room) converged with the ordinary
citizen's minority voting rights aspirations. This situation would be the
classic example of interest convergence described by the late Derrick
Bell.' 8 He posited that it is primarily in such settings of interest conver-
gence that decisional law advancing the rights of minorities will occur. Ex-
tending that to the social sphere, to the extent a sufficient number of the
majority can join with the minorities, the theory posits that progress can be
made.
On the other hand, there may be a significant concern as to whether
American cultural capacity or social constructs are able to articulate inter-
ests in a manner that permits interest convergence. To explain this con-
cern, one first must look at a current tendency in the literature to speak in
terms of first and second generation discrimination in America. 9 Yet, this
formulation is that of persons expressing a recent experience rather than
the full weight of the history of that discrimination. In her dissent in
Schuette, Justice Sonia Sotomayor went through a detailed history of the
kinds of political restructurings done for invidious or other reasons over
the years as part of American racial oppression. 20 Rather than speak of
first and second generation discrimination, my preference is to speak in
terms of twelfth or thirteenth generation discrimination as an imperfect
means of bringing into the present the history that well predates our cur-
rent experience. 2' The weight of that history informing the process of seek-
ing interest-convergence is best expressed in William Faulkner's famous
18. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
19. See Jenigh J. Garrett, The Continued Need For The Voting Rights Act: Examining Second-
Generation Discrimination, 30 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 77, 80 n.14 (2010) (citing Lani Guinier, The
Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L.
REv. 1077, 1093 (1991) ("[F]irst generation [barriers are] direct impediments to electoral participation
[and include] registration and voting barriers. Once [first generation] obstacles were surmounted ... the
focus shifted to second-generation, indirect structural barriers such as at large, vote-diluting elec-
tions.")); see also Yifat Bitton, The Limits of Equality and the Virtues of Discrimination, 2006 MICH. ST.
L. REv. 593, 632 (2006), Glenn Kunkes, Note, The Times, They Are Changing: The VRA Is No Longer
Constitutional, 27 J. L. & POL. 357 (2012), William S. Consovoy & Thomas R. McCarthy, Shelby County
v. Holder: The Restoration of Constitutional Order, 2013 CATO SuP. CT. REv. 31 (2012-2013), Sudeep
Paul, Supreme Court Commentary, The Voting Rights Act's Fight to Stay Rational: Shelby County v.
Holder, 8 DuKE J. CoNrsT. L. & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 271 (June 4, 2013), and Angelica Rolong, Com-
ment, Access Denied: Why The Supreme Court's Decision in Shelby County v. Holder May Disen-
franchise Texas Minority Voters, 46 TEX. TECH L. REv. 519, 550 (2014).
20. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for
Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1651-83 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
21. Whether we see the arrival of blacks in North America as the 20 persons in 1619 at James-
town, or back in 1508 when the black conquistador Juan Garrido arrived as a free man in Hispaniola.
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phrase: "The past is never dead. It's not even past. ' 2  This weight of the
past is expressed also in the great Italian writer Giuseppe Tomasi di Lam-
pedusa's also famous phrase that: "If we want things to stay as they are,
things will have to change. ' 23 This second formulation helps us think about
efforts at "progress" and ask the difficult question whether the net result of
that progress is maintenance or change of a very old social hierarchy. From
an economist's point of view, the kind of long-term analysis of inequality
done in Thomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century helps us bet-
ter apprehend the nature of the current period as we see it in a much
broader historical panorama than typically is the case.2 4
Seen in this light, the rich, complex history of discrimination in the
United States weighs on said efforts at negotiation, informs the implicit
social cognitions, and may limit the definition of the limits of interests that
can be sought to converge. All citizens negotiate domestic social constructs
of freedom and constraint which suggest the types of interests and the lim-
its of convergence. Even in the dynamic process of change in a given soci-
ety, the underlying social history may be reinterpreted on many occasions,
but that interpretation is against a longer term backdrop of the accumula-
tion of prior instances of change, stasis, oppression, and progress. Said so-
cial reality may be only intuitively seen as stultifying, or not seen at all as
stultifying, as these are the social constructs in which we live.
By breaking out of this self-referential structure, it may be possible to
sharpen the understanding of its opportunities and limits. A new way of
seeing what freedom and its limits can be is both invigorating and destabi-
lizing as new insights developed. In this regard, I was brought back to a
comment by James Meredith to me in 2007 that it was in his service in
Japan in the military after World War II that he came to realize that segre-
gation was not something ordained by God.2 ' The freedom and limits in
Japan tracked in a different manner from the constraints of segregation of
22. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (Random House 1951). During the Voting
Rights Symposium held at Mississippi College School of Law on March 21, 2014, I spoke about the
experience of staying at the Hilton Garden Inn, which in the Nineteenth century was called the King
Edward Hotel, then the Confederate Hotel (burned down in 1863 by General Sherman), and then the
Third House (because of the legislators who lived and worked there). It was closed in 1967 right after
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1965. All of these experiences just in where one slept were a
powerful reminder of the history, and I imagined what would have been the case if I had tried to walk
in the hotel back in the ante-bellum period. One felt the ghosts, the blood in the soil, and the change in
the spirits. I thank Dean Jim Rosenblatt of Mississippi College School of Law for taking me on a
walking tour of sites in Jackson, Mississippi, especially to the statuary for the three great literary figures
of Mississippi-Eudora Welty, William Faulkner, and Richard Wright-where I had the honor to stand
among such giants.
23. GIUSEPPE TOMASI Di LAMPEDUSA, THE LEOPARD 26 (Archibald Colquhoun trans., Time
Incorporated 1966).
24. THOMAS PIKETrY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 1-35 (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2014).
25. Private Conversation with James Meredith at the Robert Jackson Center in the Carl Cappa
Theater (Mar. 26, 2007), event details available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-center/events/
event/?datetimeid=99&KeepThis=true&TB iframe=true&width=600&height=400%2000 (last vis-
ited June 25, 2014).
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his youth in Mississippi. In the new setting, Meredith experienced free-
doms unavailable in the social construct of his youth, opening him to alter-
native visions of possibility. That opening of his spirit forever changed the
manner in which he viewed his home and helped start a process that led to
his integration of the University of Mississippi.
Another version of this experience is in the oft-repeated phrase of
Richard Wright: "I've found more freedom in one square block of Paris
than there is in the entire United States."26 That quote is frequently mis-
quoted as only referring to Mississippi during segregation. That Wright
was referring to the entire United States suggests that the kind of freedom
he was permitted to experience in the United States wherever he went was
a social construct far narrower than what a foreigner would experience as
even a non-French citizen in France. Put another way, the private and pub-
lic social construct within which interest convergence could be sought in
the United States allowed a restricted form of freedom more or less con-
strained, depending on one's geography in the United States. Yet, that
kind of freedom permitted in the American social construct was no match
in its breadth for the ordinary freedom experienced on a typical day walk-
ing down the street in Paris.
Going from these private experiences overseas of freedom and limita-
tion that were both invigorating and destabilizing for Meredith and Wright
to the public domain, one notes that as in each polity, the American social
construct is built on state structure embodied in domestic law, including
international law to the extent it is integrated in the domestic law. The
dissonance that comes from the comparative private experience of freedom
under the state structures of different countries-a form of comparative
social dualism-is also mirrored in the law. Each country constructs its
space of freedom and limit in a different manner. Americans privileged to
have personal experience in other countries have their vision of personal
potentialities back in the United States challenged and changed.
But not all Americans are so privileged to have that experience
abroad. For the ordinary citizen who does not have the opportunity for
such an experience of comparative dualism, the anomie with regard to ex-
perienced oppression remains a burden. One can call out to principles en-
shrined in the Constitution, religious thought, or other sources as a support
for efforts at redress, but the stultifying social burden of the history contin-
ually frames those calls and channels them through well worn structures of
thinking that are purely domestic.
So how does one get to the international plane without being able to
travel to the international plane? Incoherent exposure is available through
internet access but it may be difficult for reasons of language and culture to
apprehend the significance of those signals from foreign cultures. Educa-
tion (even in translation) can open the spirit to alternative social structures
coming from abroad. Yet, in a system that does not see education as a
26. MICHEL FABRE, THE WORLD OF RICHARD WRIGHT 146 (Univ. Press of Mississippi 1985).
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fundamental right, 27 where local property tax-based financing and housing
segregation are aided and abetted by reduced state and federal level spend-
ing, shifting of resources from traditional public school funding to charter
schools, student loan burdens with merit-based versus need-based financial
packages, the proliferation of questionable for-profit schools and colleges,
an orientation of resources toward the hard sciences for reasons of compet-
itiveness (rather than the humanities and social science), and other struc-
tural changes to education, the access to such a more open and meaningful
education is made attainable primarily by luck or wealth.
Returning to the law in the context of the above constraints of the
social structure, a first step might be to inform one's concerns in the com-
mon frames of domestic law. Here, the matrix of the domestic social con-
struct is revealed. While still self-referential, one begins to understand the
how and why of the domestic social structure. But, unfortunately, such an
effort still maintains the ordinary citizen in the American construct. Ac-
cess to the international plane through law might be further progressed
through the study of international law. At a minimum, the domestic social
structure of domestic law is reframed in terms of obligations on the United
States that are indifferent to the manner in which the United States is or-
ganized as a polity.
However, even with international law, whether Americans are made
familiar with international law as practiced on the international plane (as
opposed to its integration in the domestic law regime and social construct)
influences their sense of legal potentialities. There are dualisms that can be
experienced between the domestic law structure and the international law
plane. This dualism of domestic and international law as experienced in
the United States comes from the extent, or not, international law is inte-
grated into, or intentionally kept out of, the domestic law space. If one
sees only parts of international law integrated into the system and other
parts simply not considered part of the system, one has only a partial sense
of the valence of international law for oneself as the ordinary citizen. The
lack of or broken access to the international plane (either as law or per-
sonal context) deprives the citizen of the full experience of the dualism of
the self as constructed in a domestic setting and a non-domestic setting of
different social constructs of limits and freedom.
The potential impact of international law on the ordinary citizen can
be summarized in three of its basic concepts. First, is the idea of sover-
eignty: that states are generally free to determine their internal structure.28
27. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
28. Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of
Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands
Question, League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supp. No. 3, at 5-6 (1920), available at http://www
.ilsa.org/jessup/jessuplO/basicmats/aalandloriginal.pdf (last visited June 25, 2014). Generally speaking,
the grant or refusal of the right to a portion of its population of determining its own political fate by
plebiscite or by some other method is exclusively an attribute of the sovereignty of every State which is
definitively constituted. Id.
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Second, whatever the internal structure, the people's meaningful participa-
tion in their governance is an essential rule.29 Third, a state "may not in-
voke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty."3 Together, these concepts emphasize the autonomy of
each state in the international system while delimiting constraints on that
autonomy.
For the United States, our domestic law approach to integrating inter-
national law is that the "Constitution stands above all other laws [including
customary international law], executive acts, and regulations, including
treaties."'3' This vision might be termed the "United States foreign rela-
tions law vision" that places the Constitution above all law, including inter-
national law.
From the perspective of international law, like any other state, the
United States consents to be bound by treaties and is subject to customary
international law and general principles of law recognized by civilized
states. We might term this approach the "international law vision." These
international law obligations bind the United States, whatever its internal
governing structure. Even if the United States asserts the United States
foreign relations law vision both on the international plane as a political-
legal position and as a matter of domestic law, from the international law
vision that assertion does not alter the obligation on the United States,
whatever its internal structure of separation of powers and federalism.
Thus, even though internally a rule of international law is breached in the
public or private social structure, to the extent said rule is an international
law obligation on the United States, the United States is bound by said rule
of international law. This dualism is expressed somewhat succinctly by the
concept that "a rule of international law or a provision of an international
agreement is superseded as domestic law does not relieve the United States
of its international obligation or of the consequences of a violation of that
obligation."32
29. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2. S.C.R. 217, 282 (Can.), available at http://scc-csc.
lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/1643/1/document.do (last visited June 25, 2014) (stating "The recognized
sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally ful-
filled through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cul-
tural development within the framework of an existing state."); Id. at 285-86 ("A number of
commentators have further asserted that the right to self-determination may ground a right to unilat-
eral secession in a third circumstance. Although this third circumstance has been described in several
ways, the underlying proposition is that, when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its
right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession. The
Vienna Declaration requirement that governments represent 'the whole people belonging to the terri-
tory without distinction of any kind' adds credence to the assertion that such a complete blockage may
potentially give rise to a right of secession.").
30. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered
into force Jan. 27, 1980), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.netlmisc/viennaconvention.pdf (last vis-
ited June 25, 2014).
31. International Human Rights Instruments, Common Core Document Forming Part of the Re-
ports of States Parties: United States of America, 23, U.N. Doc. HRI/CORE/USA/2011 (Dec. 30,
2011), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=HRIICORE/USA2011 (last
visited June 25, 2014).
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115(1)(b) (1987).
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So, if the United States has an international obligation but it is not
implemented domestically, there is a space of law between what is an obli-
gation on the international plane and what is experienced in our domestic
public and private social structure. In contrast to the situations of purely
self-referential visions of potentialities within the internal legal structure,
the admission of an international law vision by the ordinary citizen within
that internal legal structure allows him to see potentialities that have not
been made manifest, or only imperfectly made manifest, in their daily ex-
perience inside the United States. Like those persons who experienced a
different form of freedom in their experience in other countries, the do-
mestic ordinary citizen is able to see a different way of understanding their
place in the social structure that is independent of the implications of the
selected political structure under our Constitution. Thus, all the internal
law is of interest, but it is viewed in the context of the United States inter-
national law obligations freed of the domestic constraints that shape that
internal law.
An example of this might be expressed in the definition of racial dis-
crimination in the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). Inside the United States we fo-
cus on intentional discrimination and, subject to certain hurdles, disparate
treatment. 33 On the international plane, the definition of "racial discrimi-
nation" is:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recogni-
tion, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural[,] or any other field of public life.
34
Thus, the focus is on both "purpose and effect" across a vision of racial
discrimination that was not as narrow as the United States domestic law
vision. Coming back to the solicitude for state's rights expressed in the
Schuette decision and the increasing of burdens to race-conscious affirma-
tive action in Parents and Fisher,35 all might be reframed in terms of Article
1.4 of the ICERD which states that:
33. Periodic Report of the United States of America to the United Nations Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination Concerning the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 6-7 (June 12, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/210817.pdf (last visited June 25, 2014) (stating ".... although establishing a race discrimina-
tion violation of the U.S. Constitution requires proof of discriminatory intent, many U.S. civil rights
statutes and regulations go further, prohibiting policies or practices that have discriminatory effects or
disparate impact on members of racial or ethnic minorities or other protected classes").
34. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 1.1,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969), available at http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Professionallnterest/cerd.pdf (last visited June 25, 2014).
35. See generally Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant
Rights & Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014), Fisher v. Univ. of
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Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing ade-
quate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or in-
dividuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in
order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment
or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall
not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however,
that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the
maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups
and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for
which they were taken have been achieved.36
Here, the international law indifference to the internal structure of the
United States, the de jure and de facto distinctions, and even state versus
private action concerns while focusing on special measures that combat ra-
cial discrimination reframes the struggle on affirmative action in a broader
light.37
A person with access to the experience of freedom overseas, or, at a
minimum, access to an understanding of what international law creates as
obligations for states that express a greater freedom than is internally rec-
ognized in the United States, creates a dissonance as one compares what
one has with what international law says is possible. Rather than attaching
one's anomie to personal, moral or religious principles, or interpretation of
domestic law principles, the person is able to see anew their anomie in an
international law vision that is unburdened by the domestic social con-
structs. The importance of this experience is that the person is able to step
out of the purely domestic space of domestic interest convergence and see
to what extent the convergence is on too narrow a basis as compared to a
more international standard. In this setting, the implicit social cognitions
that might define context for a negotiation are recognized as implicit
American social cognitions consistent with our social hierarchies, but only
ours. These cognitions are not immutable; on the contrary, they are altera-
ble. The essential experiences of Richard Wright and James Meredith,
once overseas, are able to be experienced through the understanding of
international law on its own rather as part of an American social construct
of international law. The end result is experiential shock in terms of the
Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), and Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
36. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 34, at art. 1.4.
37. A similar indifference (verging on disdain) pertains to the debates on the "proper" manner
of domestic interpretation of the Constitution-more internal law of little moment in the international
law vision. Internally sacrosanct discussions of the meanings of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments, and subsequent Supreme Court decisional law or legislative enactments are seen
more as information as to the manner of compliance rather than as ends in themselves. The formation
of the political system into parties and the racial or other makeup of those parties is similar information
as to a choice of structure rather than as immutable structure.
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experience of freedom, and legal shock as to what is permitted in the inter-
national regime as opposed to the domestic public and private social
structure.
The hope is that from such an experience the unstated limits of free-
dom in the domestic social structure become both more evident and painful
to experience. As a consequence, an experience of shock or dissonance
may occur and grow in the person. What life could be, and what life is
expected to be, come into contradiction for the person. Particularly for a
person who has experienced public and private social violence, who has
attempted to negotiate that experience taking into account purely domestic
implicit social cognitions and domestic views of what interests might con-
verge within a domestic legal structure, the opening to the international
plane breaks the connection between each of these links of the chain and
suggests alternative social constructs. Another experience of invigoration
and destabilization happens. The question then arises as to how one can
move on a path from this dissociative moment of dissonance to coherence,
which is the subject of the next section.
IV. FROM DISSONANCE TO COHERENCE-ONE POSSIBLE PATH
Armed with a sharpened understanding of the domestic social con-
struct through the incorporation of international law and, hopefully, expe-
rience on the international plane, a person might reframe the experience of
freedom in the United States as a series of relative social burdens to be
overcome that are more or less difficult, depending on one's place in the
social hierarchy. The domestic experience is viewed as a form of distrib-
uted freedom built on our social history, even with the progress that has
been made. The person can contrast that experience of freedom with what
international law describes. For example, in thinking of governance, one
can think of meaningful participation in one's governance as countenanced
within the domestic social structure and as a matter of international law.
Same words, but with different meanings. Being able to hold these two
visions in one's head is to have the sense of contradictions sharpened.
Where is one's path forward, especially if one is experiencing disso-
nance and shock? In such an unsettling situation, the contradictions can
seem too much and one might feel paralyzed. Yet, a further refraining of
that experience may be possible through a theory that embraces that disso-
ciative moment as the precursor to social movement. In this regard, the
work of Francesco Alberoni is particularly apropos as it describes a process
of reaching coherence without identifying the specific idea around which
one might rally.38 Alberoni speaks to that dissociative moment as a time of
depressive overload in which the contradictions between one's internal ex-
perience or reality and one's day to day reality become too much. Through
38. See FRANCESCO ALBERONI, MOVEMENT AND INSTITUTIONS (Patricia C. Arden Delmoro
trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1984). Depressive overload, the nascent state, seeking affinity to create a
movement, and the four responses of institutions to such a movement are key concepts of this monu-
mental work.
2014]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
the integration of domestic and international law, a person is able to
reshape the internal experience they have and contrast said experience
with what they live within the American polity. Those contradictions be-
tween what one thinks and one experiences create the depressive overload.
The path out of that depressive overload is through the emergence of an
idea as to how to make coherence between the internal and external exper-
iences of reality. That idea, in an almost Marxist sense of praxis, is derived
from the experience of the contradictions of depressive overload. It is an
imperfect process of envisioning coherence-Alberoni terms it the "nas-
cent state."39 With said nascent state starts a process of seeking affinity
through the discussion and shaping of the idea with others. To the extent
others are emboldened by the reframed idea that brings some coherence to
the contradictions, a movement starts to emerge among those who come
together with affinity. These movements come into contact with other
movements and from them affinity can increase or decrease. What I find
remarkable is that Alberoni takes the person from the state of depressive
overload through the development of a movement and then goes farther.
His concern is with what happens to said movements as they confront the
institutions of daily life-in law, the domestic law social construct of pri-
vate and public social violence described at the beginning of this essay.
These structures of ordinary life confront the movement and the responses
of the institutions are said to fall into four broad categories: (1) institution-
alization, (2) extinction, (3) repression, or (4) dissolution in illusion of the
movement. Thus, the path from the point of depressive overload to a new
coherence is suggested without indicating the nature of the specific
endpoint.
With the integration of the domestic approaches with the international
approaches as one comes to the point of depressive overload, the sugges-
tion I make is that a clearer understanding of the limits and potential of the
American social construct is possible. With that clearer understanding, a
more perceptive process of identifying the idea may be the basis of a move-
ment. The movement that draws on twin sources in domestic law and in-
ternational law, rather than strictly moral, religious, or domestic law
constructs alone, might help anchor the efforts of those demonstrating in
the streets (such as in North Carolina) or in other public and private ve-
nues against the state oppression. Appeals to law that are purely domestic-
focused are made to contend with appeals to international law obligations
that are on the entire United States rather than stuck in the interminable
issues of federalism and separation of powers. The citizen's duty to abide
by the law and the legitimacy of state lawful acts are reframed by both the
domestic law and international law obligations on the United States. These
twin sources of power allow the citizen to reinterpret the public and private
social violence and the manner in which he negotiates such experience in
39. Id. at 19-22.
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terms of tactics, implicit social cognitions, and the meaning of interest con-
vergence. In doing so, said negotiation of voting rights and voting intimi-
dation is done in a manner that is less tethered to the burdens of our
common and difficult history, opening a tentative but hopeful space for
new forms of freedom.
IV. CONCLUSION
A synthesis of the concepts in this essay would be to encourage the
ordinary citizen to (1) understand the private social violence, (2) under-
stand the federalism and separation of powers public social violence, (3)
understand social theory and its limits, (4) understand the domestic-inter-
national dualism, (5) experience depressive overload on a path through a
nascent state, affinity, movement, and reactions of institutions from a range
of predictable scenarios, and (6) incorporate the above as an aid to resili-
ence in the face of adversity. It would be nafve to argue that, just by the
expansion of the ordinary citizen's view through the integration with do-
mestic law and experience of international law and experience, a process of
social progress on voting rights would be inevitable. The myriad forces at
play within the domestic system preclude such a view.4 ° What this short
essay attempts to do is to suggest a path to allow the ordinary citizen to see
themselves both as an American with rights and obligations in our social
construct and as a person who is a subject of international law-someone
who derives rights and obligations from international law. In that sense,
one begins to see freedom in a different manner than the one based on the
distributed burdens of our social history. By appropriating that recognition
in a manner that is not tied to the United States domestic law or even
foreign relations law vision, the result is to encourage agency of that ordi-
nary citizen on both the domestic and international planes.41 In that man-
ner, said persons renew with an older, less state-centric tradition of
international law viewing individuals as both subjects of international law
as well as ordinary citizens of the United States. In that sense, the broader
view helps the ordinary citizen capture the vision at the highest levels of
40. See Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Inter-
est Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. (forthcoming Fall 2014), available at https://www
.princeton.edu/-mgilens/Gilens%20homepage%20materials/Gilens%20and%2OPage/Gilens%20and%
20Page%202014-Testing%20Theories%203-7-14.pdf (last visited June 25, 2014); see also MARTIN
GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA
(Princeton Univ. Press 2012).
41. For example, the shadow reporting done by United States Human Rights Groups with the
United Nations committees on human rights with respect to the periodic reports of the United States of
America on its compliance with its international obligations under the relevant international instru-
ments. See United States Human Rights Network, "Shadow Reports," available at http://www
.ushrnetwork.org/icerd-project (last visited June 25, 2014). During the 2008 review by the United Na-
tions Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination of the United States periodic report to
the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in Geneva, Switzerland on
March 5, 2008, a black high-school student from Chicago who participated in said process for the
ICERD was overheard to exclaim his new sense of agency on the international plane in saying, "I am a
human rights activist." Maybe someday he would, as well as being a lawyer for domestic law, be a
human rights lawyer too.
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American society and might, in some possibly even modest sense, help
level the playing field of discourse and action in our system of federalism
and separation of powers.
